Abstract

My dissertation is divided into four parts. In the first section, "From Fatalism to Freedom," I consider Leibniz's early modal views, beginning with his short-lived affirmation of fatalism in 1671. This section includes a consideration of Leibniz's reference to the syllogisms, Darapti and Felapton, in The Philosopher's Confession. I endeavor to explain why Leibniz might have thought that by considering these syllogisms one could come to see that a contingent truth could be entailed by a necessary truth. I also discuss Leibniz's denial of fatalism in "On Freedom and Possibility." ;In the second part of my thesis, "Necessity, Contingency, and Certainty," I examine the ways in which Leibniz attempted to preserve contingency once he came to accept the so-called in-esse account of truth. In addition, I argue that the analytic account of contingency was the mature Leibnizian approach to contingency, notwithstanding some passages in the Theodicy that seem to suggest otherwise. ;I begin the third section, "Leibniz's Universal Possibilism," by noting that Spinozistic fatalism was not the only modal pitfall Leibniz wished to avoid; he also wanted to steer clear of the Cartesian view that propositions do not possess their modalities with necessity. I argue that Leibniz's analytic account of contingency requires the rejection of whatever follows from a necessary truth is necessarily true in favor of whatever follows from a necessary truth is true as the correct principle of entailment. I show that a commitment to whatever follows from a necessary truth is true requires an acceptance of the Cartesian view that propositions do not possess their modalities with necessity. ;In the fourth and final part of my thesis, "Leibniz's Modal Presupposition," I argue that Leibniz could not have avoided a Cartesian account of modality simply by abandoning his analytic approach to contingency in favor of one of his earlier views, for those views also required an acceptance of whatever follows from a necessary truth is true