On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360 (2001)
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Abstract

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.

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Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension.Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):449-479.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.

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References found in this work

Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Set Theory.Keith J. Devlin - 1981 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (4):876-877.
Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.

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