Could've Thought Otherwise

Philosophers' Imprint 20 (12) (2020)
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Abstract

Evidence is univocal, not equivocal. Its implications don't depend on our beliefs or values, the evidence says what it says. But that doesn't mean there's no room for rational disagreement between people with the same evidence. Evaluating evidence is a lot like polling an electorate: getting an accurate reading requires a bit of luck, and even the best pollsters are bound to get slightly different results. So, even though evidence is univocal, rationality's requirements are not "unique." Understanding this resolves several puzzles to do with uniqueness and disagreement.

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Jonathan Weisberg
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.
Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.
Pro tem rationality.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):383-403.
Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.

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