Abstract

Analytic Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have been arguing that the mind is a computer-like syntactical engine, and that all human mental capacities that are worth discussing can be described as digital computational processes. To defend this view, its proponents must insist that all thought can be structured in propositional format, and that all thinking processes are describable as logical functions on those propositions. Proponents of Cognitive Science maintain that thinking is one type of activity, whether performed by humans or by computers. ;Against the rising tide of philosophers committed to this view, I have presented a naturalistic human view of thinking. Like John Searle, I believe that computers are merely sophisticated machines. Although they may be more efficient than humans in processing syntactical material, computers are simulating thought when they crunch symbols, not thinking. In this thesis I argue that thinking is a process that is rooted in experience and contact with reality. I point out that semantics, de re reference, indexicals, meaning and causation are all rooted in human experience and life. Without life and experience, these elements of discourse and knowledge refer to nothing. And without these elements of discourse and knowledge, syntax is vacant structure, not thinking. I present a new structure for understanding thinking in this paper