The Roles of Sensation and Intellection in Aristotle's "de Anima"

Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (1984)
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Abstract

The introduction to the thesis surveys the status which the common sense and passive intellect have throughout the history of Aristotelian scholarship. We note that although the tradition of Aristotelian commentary maintains that the Aristotelian common sense is identical to other psychic faculties , recent commentators tend to deny this view. ;We next consider Aristotle's account of sensation. We reconcile several apparently conflicting discussions of sensation found in the de Anima, and we argue against contemporary opinions that Aristotle has a doctrine of the common sense, and that this faculty is identical with other sense faculties . ;After considering sensation, we turn to Aristotle's discussion of intellection. Our treatment of intellection serves two purposes. We first note that intellection is, for Aristotle, a multisignificant concept. The many senses of intellection found in the corpus can be reconciled through the means of focal reference . Second, we localize the focal sense of intellection in the use of the intelligible form. ;The third chapter of the thesis localizes the discussion of the passive intellect found in de Anima III, 5 within the context of the entire work. Sensation and intellection are than distinguished from one another, and we note that sensation is a prerequisite for intellection. We then argue for the identity of the passive intellect and common sense, by considering the matter-form analogy with which de Anima III, 5 opens. The passive intellect is the matter of intellection, "matter" in the sense of "that out of which". We show that since sensation is a prerequisite for intellection, it is the matter for intellection. However, since we noted the faculty of sensation is the common sense, we argue for the identity of the common sense with the passive intellect. Brief mention is also made of the active intellect: this intellect, we argue, is not a part of the body-soul complex. ;The thesis concludes by showing the limits of our study and offering suggestions for futher investigation

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