Abstract

This chapter argues that virtue is a component of wellbeing. It argues on the “virtue is its own reward” side; specifically, the claim is that moral virtue is an intrinsic prudential benefit. Virtues are often classified as ‘self‐regarding’ and ‘other‐regarding’ depending on whether the primary benefit of the virtues accrues to the virtuous agent, or some other. Applying the method of difference argument shows that moral virtue is a benefit to the agent. A different means of assessing whether moral virtue ought to be included on our objective list has been suggested by Brad Hooker, who applies the sympathy test to the question of whether moral virtue is a benefit to the agent. There are limitations to the sympathy test: specifically, the test seems to track matters other than wellbeing. Besides, the author believes a better application of the sympathy test will reveal that moral virtue is an intrinsic benefit.