Virtue, Reason, and Principle

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):469-495 (1991)
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Abstract

A common strategy unites much that philosophers have written about the virtues. The strategy can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who suggested that human beings have a characteristic function or activity, and that the virtues are traits of character which enable humans to perform this kind of activity excellently or well. The defining feature of this approach is that it treats the virtues as functional concepts, to be both identified and justified by reference to some independent goal or end which they enable people to attain. Some recent philosophers seem to have hoped that by following this perfectionist strategy, we might attain a more convincing account of our moral practices than rule-based theories of ethics have been able to provide.

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R. Jay Wallace
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions.Jeremy Reid - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (1):78-97.
Moral sensitivity: The central question of moral education.Roger Marples - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (2):342-355.
Virtue as mastery in early confucianism.Aaron Stalnaker - 2010 - Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (3):404-428.

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References found in this work

After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.
On the value of acting from the motive of duty.Barbara Herman - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):359-382.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe & R. Rhees - 1954 - Philosophy of Science 21 (4):353-354.

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