Abstract

This thesis is conceived as a defense of the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence against a number of serious contemporary attacks leveled against it. ;Tucked into the orthodox Stoic doctrine are two distinct theories. First, there is the claim that the cosmos undergoes cyclic destruction by fire, a conflagration or ekpyrosis sparked by a particular alignment of celestial bodies. Each ekpyrosis is followed by a period of cosmic regeneration and the spontaneous creation of a new world. Beyond this theory of cosmic periodicity, there is the Stoic doctrine of strict recurrence, which states that the new world generated is always an exact replica of its predecessor, in respect of both its physical structure and history. ;The thesis comprises an introduction, three chapters, and concluding remarks. In each chapter, I respond to a single species of attack on Stoic recurrence. In Chapter One, I argue that attacks on the physics and metaphysics that underlie the cosmic ekpyrosis miss their mark. Specifically, I maintain that R. B. Todd's anti-materialist interpretation of the Stoic archai violates the unique character of Stoic physics as a teleological materialism. I argue further that M. Lapidge's criticisms of Zeno's ekpyrosis are ineffectual when the doctrine is viewed within its native teleological framework. ;In Chapter Two, I examine the philosophical theories of causality, determinism, and perfection presumed by the doctrine of strict recurrence, arguing for their mutual consistency and their serviceability to the peculiar teleological physics of the Old Stoa. ;In Chapter Three, I consider J. Barnes' famous attack on the logic of recurrence, which turns on his claim that the Stoics were committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and the view that time is relativized to the cosmic cycle. I argue that neither supposed commitment is consistent with the extant Stoic fragments on time and identity. In the process, I show that A. A. Long's revisionist interpretation of Stoic recurrence, as crucially involving the assumption of closed time, is plainly incompatible with both the explicit doctrine of the temporal fragments and the implicit logic of recurrence. ;I conclude by reiterating the multiple and mutually supportive connections between the teleological background of Stoic physics and the idiosyncratic doctrine of recurrence nestled within it