Husserl's Phenomenology of Time as a Theory of Consciousness: Critique
Dissertation, Boston University (
1984)
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Abstract
The proposed dissertation discusses the problem of time in the way raised by Husserl: as a problem of consciousness. For the meaning of time, i.e., the meaning of temporal differentiations--past, present, future--can be disclosed only in the context of consciousness, and the meaning of consciousness can be disclosed only through the human awareness of time. ;The procedure consists of five steps: historical introduction; a pre-theoretical view of the problem of time in contemporary literature; textual analysis of Husserl's earlier and later conceptions of time; the horizons opened and limits posited by Husserl in philosophizing on consciousness; the possibilities of philosophical modelling of consciousness. ;The main argument is that in his analysis of consciousness Husserl went beyond the rationalistic framework within which he was working. Husserl came to the conclusion that there is a subject-free consciousness which contradicted his proclaimed philosophical principles. ;The dissertation's criticism of Husserl has been influenced by three philosophers: Alexander Piatigorsky, Merab Mamardashwili , and David Zilberman . Their meta-theory of consciousness is primordially interpretative and approaches consciousness from two sides--the psyche and culture. It advocates the independent ontological status of the pure consciousness in contrast to which everything, including culture and the psyche, must be considered as naturalistic. Also, it introduces an extra-level of integration in consciousness--cultural mentality. Finally, by treating the psychic states as signs of consciousness, it offers more powerful critique of psychologism. ;The main conclusion of the dissertation is that a particular approach to consciousness depends first on the cultural framework within which it takes place; secondly on an emphasis on a modus of consciousness--perception, memory, imagination, categorical activity, etc.; and thirdly on the type of experience in which this modus is given and analyzed--religion, art, science, and philosophy