The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability

Topoi 41 (5):859-869 (2021)
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Abstract

In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things _differently_. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem.

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Imke von Maur
Universität Osnabrück

Citations of this work

Scripts and Social Cognition.Gen Eickers - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (54):1565-1587.
Affective scaffolding in addiction.Zoey Lavallee - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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