Abstract

Plato’s Euthyphro, I argue, lays out a metaethics that responds to persistent and unresolved value disagreement. The dialogue’s analysis of disagreement leads to the distinction between three kinds of value, exemplified by the good, the god-loved, and the pious. With this proposal, I reject centuries of scholarship, which ascribe a realist metaethics to the Plato of the Euthyphro. But only the good and the just require a ‘realist’ analysis: we relate to them as features of the world to which we have attitudes, not as features of the world that are conferred by our attitudes. The god-loved is overtly attitudinal, thus calling for an anti-realist account. A compelling account of the pious has both realist and anti-realist dimensions. All three kinds of value, I argue, are to be found in the domain of law. Here, too, the good and the just require a realist, the legal an anti-realist, and the lawful a realist and anti-realist analysis. As important as piety was for millennia, it is a non-issue in today’s metaethics. But its analogue in the domain of the law, the lawful, plays a crucial role in our lives today. While we recognize legality as potentially flawed, respect for the law is an indispensable attitude if we are to strive towards improved lives and improved societies.