Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:160 THE HUMEAN PROMISE: WHENCE COMES ITS OBLIGATION? Introduction David Hume offers an extended analysis of promising, and his observations and conclusions reflect a remarkable insight into the nature and origins of promising and promissory obligation. Hume argues that promising is naturally unintelligible and could only arise via an artifice; that this artifice arises because each person sees his or her mutual advantage in it; and that afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest and becomes a new obligation upon mankind. How, for Hume, do promises obligate, and how are we to understand this new obligation? I shall argue that for Hume the obligations of promising are two: the natural obligation to accept and participate in the artifice itself — this obligation arises from a natural inclination to approve of those artifices which we see as necessary for our survival — and the artificial obligation to faithfully execute a particular service or transaction of property in the future as expressed by the words? promise'. I shall begin with some explanatory remarks on Hume's views of human nature and the artifices which this nature produces, some of which bear directly on our understanding of Hume's treatment of promissory obligation. Background Hume's view of mankind is that it is a selfcorrective species, relying heavily on its penchant for imagination, and that without these traits, particularly imagination, it would be, without doubt, an extinct species. Much of the Treatise is a naturalistic account of human nature: a nature which includes not only instincts and passions, but the 161 ability to transcend and control them with artificial conventions when they become counterproductive and disadvantageous to society; although even these artificial conventions or artifices must be approved by their users and, to this extent, are a natural outcome. "We readily forget," Hume states, "that the designs, and projects, and views of men are principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry." (T 474) Hume attaches no necessity to the particular form human nature has taken nor to the environment in which it is placed. His aim is to give a naturalistic account of the way things are, both socially and psychologically. Hume uses the word 'natural' in one place to mean what is common to any species, or what is inseparable from the species, and this includes for him the artifices of mankind. (T 484) Unlike Hobbes, he optimistically describes human nature as a combination of self-interest and benevolence, and "...tho' it be rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself; yet 'tis as rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over-balance all the selfish." (T 487) The natural virtues originate from our kind affections and have no dependence on the contrivance 2 or artifice of man (T 574) nor on the contrivance of a deity. What makes meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity and equity virtuous is simply man's natural approval of them: "virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." (T 475) Hume's natural virtues are selected from natural motives which are of the spontaneous instinctive sort. Although Hume believes that selfishness is an overemphasized human trait, he does say that each man 162 (and probably woman) loves himself (herself) better than any other single person. (T 487) This selfishness, however, is not exclusively selfcentered, but manifests itself in a "confined generosity" that moves outward concentrically from the interested self to his or her family and friends. Beyond this circle of friends we are generally distrustful of others and will naturally revert to our individual self-interest when interacting with them. The one trait of which Hume makes great use throughout the Treatise to explain and describe human behavior is imagination. The word 'imagination' has many meanings, three of which are alluded to by Hume. Imagination may take a material or practical shape in the form of an invention, whereby someone imagines some object and then invents it. Examples of imagination qua inventiveness include actual physical inventions and may include the Humean artifices. Imagination...