The overwhelming prevalence of suffering in nature

Revista de Bioética y Derecho 42:181-195 (2018)
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Abstract

There are several reasons to believe that there is a predominance of suffering over wellbeing in nature. The difference grows exponentially when the suffering of invertebrates is taken into consideration. Given the relevance of the experience of pain when it comes to attributing moral considerability to an individual, the seriousness and implications of the above statements are significant due to the need to reconcile the interests of an enormous number of individuals who experience pain to some degree. Depending on the species and the ecosystem, there are variations that must be kept in mind with the aim of reducing the existing amount of suffering.

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Evidence against epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
Is unhappiness morally more important than happiness?James Griffin - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):47-55.
Marginal cases and moral relevance.Mark Bernstein - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (4):523–539.

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