Challenges to Groups as Epistemic Communities: Liminality of Common Sense and Increasing Variability of Word Meanings

Social Epistemology 32 (3):164-174 (2018)
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Abstract

The ‘epistemic calculus of groups’ posits functions to group-generated knowledge. In this article, those same epistemic group functions are now re-evaluated as means by which group members may tackle two contemporary and increasing challenges, or even obstructions, to knowledge. These obstructions, namely the liminality, the increasingly transitional nature of both ‘common sense’ and ‘common word meanings,’ occur, as our mass and social media practices change. Can groups still remain as ‘epistemic communities’ and regenerate common sense or common word meanings? As a response to media developments and to counterarguments by the analytic social epistemologists, I reconceptualize the functions of the ´epistemic calculus of groups´ as skills, and present a synthetic approach toward thinking in small groups to enable the regeneration of common meanings. As a basis in the analysis of the notions of common sense and common word meanings, I use the theory of psychologic: a theory built on formal logic. F...

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References found in this work

Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
Non‐Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.Martha Craven Nussbaum - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):32-53.
Social Epistemology.Steve Fuller - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (1):131-135.
Collective epistemic goals.Don Fallis - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.

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