Abstract

In this work I have tried to justify the principle theses of Meinong's Theory of Objects and to criticize some ontological theses that do not seem to derive from the Theory of Objects. This work has been divided into three parts according to the fundamental classification of objects given by Meinong: object of representation, object of thought, and objects of emotion. ;In the first part I have analysed the doctrine of intentionality in relation with intentional act and content, and their sorts of presentation in discussion with Brentano. ;In following I have given an interpretation of "pure object" and its status of "Assersein" by which pure object is beyond being and non-being. This is developed in close connection to the doctrine of impossible objects and the Theory of Objects as the most universal science inasmuch as it harbors both real and unreal worlds . I have built an extensive critique of Russell's theory of Descriptions and Denoting, and other opposing views. The rest of this part is devoted to both incomplete objects and objects of higher order . The theory of incomplete object is connected to our way of knowing things, and it expresses the incompleteness of our intentional attitudes. The theory of objects of higher order tries to explain the problem of space-time continuum. ;The second part began with the demonstration of "existence" and nature of Objectives . The Objective is grasped by either a judgment or an assumption, whether its true/false value is included in it or not. I have developed an extensive analysis of modalities--factuality, necessity and possibility--, and quasi-modalities--probability and truth--in order to give a complete Theory of Knowledge integrated in an Ontology. ;The last part was an analysis the objects of emotional lived experiences: the "dignitative" and the "desiderative." The dignitative harbors ethical and esthetical values, while the desiderative contains moral and esthetical laws, and in general, the "duties." The main analysis of this part treats the question of justification of the ethical objects and their grounding in intellectual objects