On the epistemic status of borderline cases

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):179-184 (2012)
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Abstract

n this paper I argue that the epistemicist account of vagueness cannot be entirely correct. After analysing the main features of Williamson’s view, I propose a novel approachto the epistemological problem of borderline cases.

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