Strict Identity with No Overlap

Studia Logica 82 (3):371-378 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
502 (#39,282)

6 months
79 (#65,423)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Achille C. Varzi
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Counterpart theories for everyone.Achille C. Varzi - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4691-4715.
Modal Conceptions of Essence.Alessandro Torza - 2024 - In Kathrin Koslicki & Michael J. Raven (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Essence in Philosophy. Routledge.
How to Lewis a Kripke–Hintikka.Alessandro Torza - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):743-779.
'Identity' without Identity.Alessandro Torza - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):67-95.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

View all 10 references / Add more references