Abstract

If the condemnation and crucifixion of Christ is interpreted in the key of Lutheran divine omniscience and absence of alternative possibilities, an apparent contradiction regarding the moral responsibility and duties of the Israelite executioners of Christ would arise. This contradiction would be the following: How can we sustain the moral responsibility of the executioners if they did not have alternative possibilities and, according to Christ’s first Saying on the cross, they did not know what they were doing? How could it be possible to attribute duties to the executioners if they were not able to fulfill them? These problems can be addressed from a semicompatibilistic perspective of moral responsibility. It could be argued that: 1) the absence of alternative possibilities does not exclude the fact that the executioners could be considered morally responsible for Christ’s crucifixion, and that 2) the impossibility of fulfilling certain duties does not imply that the executioners would not have had these duties and cannot be considered morally responsible for their breach.