Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games

Theory and Decision 67 (3):303-340 (2009)
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Abstract

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class

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