Reasoning, defeasibility, and the taking condition

Philosophers' Imprint 20 (28):1–16 (2020)
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Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales

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Akratic Beliefs and Seemings.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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