Kierkegaard's Defense of Reason
Dissertation, University of Kansas (
1991)
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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the views of Soren Kierkegaard concerning the nature of reason. The question concerning Kierkegaard's view of reason is twofold: What view of reason does he as an anti-rationalist reject, and what view of reason and its uses does he as a non-irrationalist accept? In this study I try to show, first, that Kierkegaard does not present an existential challenge to reason, since in his view reason plays a vital role in individual ethico-religious development, but he does present a challenge to rationalism, particularly in the form of Hegelian speculation. Second, it is my position that Kierkegaard provides a strong defense of reason. In order to construct his conception of reason, I examine his views on a variety of topics. These include the nature of subjectivity and objectivity, the relationship between the human will and reason, reason's relationship to faith and sin, and I offer a comparison of Kierkegaard and Martin Luther. As I see it, Kierkegaard provides a non-necessary, non-categorical conception of reason. This means that, according to him, the proper roles, functions, and uses of reason vary according to the aspect of human existence that is under consideration. Kierkegaard's unsystematic formulations of pragmatic and religious reason constitute this non-necessary, non-categorical conception. Whereas for him pragmatic reason may be either regenerated or unregenerated , his concept of religious reason is always regenerated reason and is crucial to the life of faith