Decisions to Terminate Life and the Concept of a Person

In John Ladd (ed.), Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 62–92 (1979)
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Abstract

This paper deals with the moral issues relevant to medical decisions to terminate the life of a human organism. The expression “termination of life” will be used to cover both (1) active intervention to bring about a state of an Organism that will cause its death, and (2) a failure to intervene in causal processes that will otherwise result in the death of an organism. I shall attempt to distinguish the different cases in which the decision to terminate life is morally justified and to isolate the considerations that are morally relevant to such decisions. Decisions to terminate life: some possibly relevant considerations There are a number of considerations that different people think relevant to medical decisions to terminate life and that are taken into account in actual medical practice. The following questions capture, I hope, the main ones: 1. Can the Organism in question be characterized as a person? 2. If the Organism is not a person, is it at least a potential person; that is such as will develop into a person? 3. If the Organism is a person, does he or she desire his or her own death, and if so is that desire a rational one? 4. If the Organism is a potential person, will this potential person express a rational desire to die once it becomes capable of expressing such a desire? 5. What quality of life will this person enjoy 6. What quality of life will this potential person enjoy? 7. What is the cost of maintaining the life of this person? 8. What is the cost of allowing this potential person to become a person, and then of maintaining his or her life? 9. Are we dealing with an unconscious person whom it is technologically impossible to restore to consciousness? 10. Is the termination of life a matter of active intervention or only a matter of refraining from saving the life of the organism? 11. Are we dealing with the case of “direct” killing or only one of “indirect” killing? 12 Does it require “ extraordinary” or only “ordinary” means to keep the person alive? 13. Is the individual suffering from a fatal illness? There are two ways in which each of these considerations might be relevant to a decision to terminate life. First, it might bear upon the question of whether it is morally permissible to terminate life. Secondly, if termination of life is morally permissible it may be relevant to the question of whether there is any positive reason for terminating life.

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Michael Tooley
University of Colorado, Boulder

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Slippery slope arguments.David E. White - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (2‐3):206-213.

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