Identity, Analyticity and Epistemic Conservatism
Sorites 13:72-79 (
2001)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
In the first instance, the paper proposes a response to W.V.O. Quine's infamous attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction which attempts to carve out a core notion of analyticity by strictly delimiting the extension of that concept. The resulting position -- epistemic conservatism -- provides a platform for a significant epistemic challenge to essentialist positions of the kind proposed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam: under exactly which kinds of circumstance are we warranted in asserting that we have grasped the truth of an identity-statement of the requisite kind? In the absence of a clear and complete response to that epistemic challenge, the paper concludes that the Kripke-Putnam case remains not proven