Abstract

My study reevaluates two theories of human space perception, a trigonometric surveying theory I call perspectivism and a "scene recognition" theory I call realism. ;Realists believe that retinal image geometry can supply no unambiguous information about an object's size and distance--and that, as a result, viewers can locate objects in space only by making discretionary interpretations based on familiar experience of object types. Perspectivists, in contrast, think viewers can disambiguate object sizes/distances on the basis of retinal image information alone. More specifically, they believe the eye responds to perspective image geometry with an automatic trigonometric calculation that not only fixes the directions and shapes, but also roughly fixes the sizes and distances of scene elements in space. ;Today this surveyor theory has been largely superceded by the realist approach, because most vision scientists believe retinal image geometry is ambiguous about the scale of space. However, I show that there is a considerable body of neglected evidence, both past and present, tending to call this scale ambiguity claim into question. ;I maintain that this evidence against scale ambiguity could hardly be more important, if one considers its subversive implications for the scene recognition theory that is not only today's reigning approach to spatial vision, but also the foundation for computer scientists' efforts to create space-perceiving robots. ;If viewers were deemed to be capable of automatic surveying calculations, the discretionary scene recognition theory would lose its main justification. Clearly, it would be difficult for realists to maintain that we viewers rely on scene recognition for space perception in spite of our ability to survey. And in reality, as I show, the surveyor theory does a much better job of describing the everyday space we viewers actually see--a space featuring stable, unambiguous relationships among scene elements, and a single horizon and vanishing point for receding objects. In addition, I argue, the surveyor theory raises fewer philosophical difficulties, because it is more in harmony with our everyday concepts of material objects, human agency and the self