Abstract
Meinong's early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des
Gedächtnisses, provides, despite its brevity, a very important
discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some
points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly
broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his
argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent
concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in
the following way. In section (1), I present Meinong's definition of
memory, and contrast it with more recent conceptions. In section (2), I
present his epistemological discussion of memory judgements, which
is further investigated in section (3), where I discuss the notion of
presumptive evidence via the criticisms it elicited from Franz
Brentano. At the end of this presentation, we will understand why
Meinong's essay is a landmark in the philosophical investigation of
memory.