Moral objectivity and moral freedom

Ethics 75 (2):117-127 (1965)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In "reason and conduct" henry david aiken maintains that there is an antinomy of moral objectivity and freedom. Freedom requires that we each choose our own moral principles while objectivity requires that there be universally binding principles. He resolves the antinomy by proposing a principle of objectivity consistent with a diversity of moral codes, Thus forsaking universalizability in ethics. However, His notion of freedom is too stringent and his objectivity inadequate in not encompassing universalizability. Still, Aiken's concept of objectivity is important in pointing to the defeasibility of all our moral positions. (staff)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,471

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intractable conflicts and moral objectivity: A dialogical, problem-based approach.William Rehg - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):229 – 257.
After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.
Can scientists be objective?Malcolm Williams - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (2):163 – 180.
Morality and freedom.By Alan Carter - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):161–180.
Two Problems of Moral Objectivity.Steven Ross - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-62.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
72 (#230,488)

6 months
15 (#174,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references