Abstract

Meaning is made out of the world by our actions in certain situations. But there are so many different things we can do, few of which actually create meaning. Not only do we utter linguistic expressions, but we move, gesture, point; we plan our actions to satisfy particular goals, we form beliefs, presumptions and prejudices, as well as ascribe intentions to other actors. In this paper three ways of acting are singled out for their function in making meaning out of the world: demonstrations, indications and experiments. The paper develops some Wittgensteinean themes, such as the priority of demonstration, the nature of pictorial representations and the relation between interpretation and calculation, in the terms and concepts of Situation Theory. It attempts to weave some important elements of Wittgenstein’s thought in with an account of situated meaning and interpretation, without embarking on any archeological adventure. The paper is intended as a contribution to the philosophical foundations of Situation Theory and a critical commentary to some of its published accounts. Although Situation Theory has been developed with a sharp awareness of its antecedents in Bertrand Russell’s work, as well as its immediate heritage of central aspects of David Kaplan’s account of demonstrative reference, to my knowledge its Wittgensteinean roots have not been traced. The account of demonstrations, indications and experiments advocated here shows not only that important philosophical concerns of Situation Theory have their precursors in Wittgenstein’s work, but also that some of his insights could profitably be absorbed into its new foundations for a theory of meaning.