Anti-realism and logic: truth as eternal

New York: Oxford University Press (1987)
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Abstract

Anti-realism is a doctrine about logic, language, and meaning that is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Frege. In this book, Professor Tennant clarifies and develops Dummett's arguments for anti-realism and ultimately advocates a radical reform of our logical practices.

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Neil Tennant
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
Substructural Logics: A Primer.Francesco Paoli - 2002 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.

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