Abstract

In order for us to associate a word with an object it might seem that we would need to have direct experience with both. Given the present technology, however, there are some objects with which we can have no direct experience, namely the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories. The problem taken up here is how to refer to those entities. There are two prominent attempts to explain reference in scientific theories – the first is Ramsey and Carnap’s proposal that we exchange theoretical terms for variables and existential quantification. The second is Kripke and Evan’s causal theory of names and rigid designation. I will argue that the most plausible theory of reference to unobservables lies in between these two theories; terms that purport to refer to unobservable entities, when occurring within a theory, need to be thought of as bound variables. But when those same terms occur in sentences outside of the theory, as when spoken, for example, they occur as genuine referring expressions, which have their reference determined by a theory