Abstract

The main interest of this work resides in the relationship between postmodernism and what is referred to as post-phenomenology. Post-phenomenology is defined as a self-critical phenomenology which goes beyond the initial guidelines set out by Husserl. The analysis of post-phenomenology is limited to the work of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty while the analysis of postmodernism is limited almost exclusively to the work of Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault. The central question of this thesis concerns the similarities and differences between postmodernism and post-phenomenology. This question can be broken down into three parts. First, an analysis of specific criticisms directed at phenomenology by postmodernism--for this purpose a detailed examination of Jacques Derrida's critique of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl serves as a limit. Secondly, elaboration of the differences between postmodernism and phenomenology--an interpretation of Foucault's 'ethics' and a return to the work of Henri Bergson as interpreted by Gilles Deleuze function in this capacity. Thirdly, an account of those aspects of postmodernism and phenomenology that suggest a clear affinity. In order to emphasize these similarities, the present study focuses on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Given that postmodernism and post-phenomenology have something in common, the ultimate goal of this work is to spell out the ontological implications of these two different strategic responses to the same philosophical questions. Some of these implications include the ethical corollary of the 'displacement of the subject', and the methodological effect of the rejection of categorical truth.