Abstract

Research in human reproductive biology raises ethical questions about the status of the research subjects involved. In attempting to regulate this research, society is faced with a plurality of views. A basis for consensus is needed. ;The literature offers such a basis in the concept of person. However, substantial disagreement exists as to whether the ontological or the moral sense of person is more fundamental for moral determinations. This gap is bridged by the argument that the moral sense of person is directly related to an ontological definition of person in the strict sense: a rational, self-conscious, self-determining being. ;Rights are properly possessed by persons in the strict sense, and are conferred on persons in the social sense, who hold them equally securely. Though society does not recognize social personhood until viability or birth, within the family it is arguably recognized at quickening. ;A third type of personhood is proposed as a public criterion to regulate research: psychic personhood. A person in the psychic sense has the potential for personhood, and the physiological capacity to retain experience. Minimal brain function signifies entry into this category, thus indicating that the fetus must be protected as a human subject after six weeks' gestation. Nonviable living aborted fetuses have lost the potential for personhood, but being personlike, they too may be used in research only under stringent limitations. ;In vitro-fertilized embryos of less than fourteen days' gestation lack both biological and metaphysical characteristics which carry moral status. They are possible rather than potential persons, and no convincing reasons can be found for proscribing their use in research. ;In the laboratory, no fetus may be preserved beyond six weeks' gestation unless it is to be brought to term. Between two and six weeks, personhood is not present, but potential personhood is morally relevant. At this stage, the embryo has inherent value, so could be used in research only for reasons serious enough to override this value. In the present state of research, however, even attempting artificial implantation and support of human previable life would be unethical