A Sketch of a Presentist Theory of Passage

Erkenntnis 73 (1):133-140 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips. I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed.

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2010-03-13

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Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
What is temporal error theory?Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2427-2444.
Causation in a timeless world.Sam Baron & Kristie Miller - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2867-2886.

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References found in this work

Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Brutal Composition.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.

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