Preference and resistance to change do not always covary

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):112-113 (2000)
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Abstract

Nevin & Grace's primary argument against theory and research on behavioral momentum is that preference and resistance to change may not covary. The method for evaluating preference and resistance to change seems problematic. Moreover, the theory fails to account convincingly for effects of average overall time to primary reinforcement on choice and preference for unsegmented schedules.

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10.1017/s0140525x00452404

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