Abstract

In the paper I argue that the concept of the semblance in the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, far from being marginal one, is one of the most fundamental conception of their theory of knowledge. Through grasping and mastering of the semblance, the dialectic emerges as a significant moment in realisation of the project of reason’s self-knowledge which in its turn renders the semblance lucid and neutralized. Particularly significant here is Hegel’s logic which enables one to scrutinize the interplay of the identity and difference, and is responsible for the dynamic inherent in this concept. In the light of the criticism of the discourses of self-knowledge, the semblance may be understood as the moment of irrationality of what is rational; it may be perceived also as a necessary moment since what is rational is not able to attain self-confirmation or self-knowledge in any other way but through referring to the Other. By reference to the language of French philosophers one can say that the semblance is crucial for the successful convergence of thinking. Thus the dialectic of semblance not only reflects the activity of reason in Kantian and Hegelian projects, but is also a reflection of the philosophical self-knowledge in general.Key words SEMBLANCE, DIALECTIC