HOW MUCH DO WE LEARN ABOUT HALLUCINATIONS FROM THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS?
Abstract
HOW MUCH DO WE LEARN ABOUT HALLUCINATIONS FROM
THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS?
The idea that our sensory experience cannot serve as a ground for
knowledge lingers on within philosophical thinking from its very
beginning. Since even the ancient sceptics argued against the possibility
of knowledge based on sense perception due to its potentially illusory or
hallucinatory character, it seems reasonable to address the issue of
hallucination itself.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss upon the philosophical
account of hallucination present in current debates. I will mainly work
on the so-called ‘argument from hallucination’ which provides a
prevalent objection both against the direct realism theory of perception,
and externalist theories of content of experience. My primary intention
will be to single out the ontological claims concerning hallucinatory
experience that constitute the core of the argument from hallucination.
Moreover, the legitimacy of philosophical theses concerning
hallucination will be discussed both by means of philosophical analysis,
and in the light of chosen empirical findings.