Commentary on Aristotle's Function Argument and the Concept of Mental Illness

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (3):203-207 (1998)
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Abstract

This is a brief comment on Christopher Megone's essay appearing in this issue. Cells, tissues, organs, and human beings qua biological organisms have natural functions, but human beings qua agents do not. Persons-in-society, unlike organs-in-bodies, are the products of culture, not simply of nature. Bodily disease is defined as a deviation from an objectively identifiable biological norm. The natural function of the kidney is to secrete urine; uremia is a literal disease. The social function of adults in American society includes mingling with others in places away from home; "agoraphobia" may thus be called a metaphorical disease. In short, typhoid fever is a literal illness or disease; spring fever is a metaphorical illness or nondisease. Megone, however, rejects the claim that literal diseases "are physical disorders." Would he regard spring fever as a "real disease"? If not, why not?

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Mental Illness, Metaphysics, Facts and Values.Chris Megone - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (3):399-426.

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