No Problem: Evidence that Problem Intuitions Are Not Widespread

Abstract

The meta-problem is “the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness”. This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this “we," arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery.

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Author Profiles

Eyuphan Ozdemir
Victoria University of Wellington (PhD)
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington

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