Abstract

This thesis examines the theories of action, decision-making and human nature in the Xunzi, an ancient Chinese text from the Warring States period. It focuses in particular on Xunzi’s concept xin. The discussion begins with a challenge to a widely-accepted but often unsupported assumption in the literature that human desires are sometimes set in tension against the heart/mind As a corollary of this view, it is also often suggested that yu is associated with a lack of morality, while xin is the moral capacity. This thesis proposes an original understanding of yu, that is, that yu is causally inert and hence does not stand in opposition to xin, as if yu and xin belonged to two separate human capabilities or areas of function. The discussion then proceeds to investigate the nature of xin. It is proposed that xin has a natural preference for certain objects and may, in that light, initiate action to pursue or even modify the pursuit of these objects. On this view, the basis upon which xin deliberates is not necessarily a moral one. For Xunzi, making the right decision, and doing the right thing, is the result of xin being properly trained to know Dao. On this account, both desirable and undesirable behaviours are attributed to xin. The latter occurs because xin does not fully or appropriately know Dao. An underlying assumption is that once xin knows Dao, it simultaneously understands the importance of abiding by it and will set out to do so. An important implication of this way of understanding Xunzi’s conception of xin is that it also bears on the way we understand Xunzi’s theory of human nature.