Abstract

In his Concepts. Where cognitive Science went wrong , Fodor argues for his own conceptual atomism within the framework of the Representational Theory of the Mind. It is usually said that this point of view implies a strong involvement with nativism and this propose to analyze the nativist implications of his atomism.Firstly I refer to some aspects of Fodor´s views on concepts and I anticipate my central thesis: in spite of the usual interpretations according to which he is a supporter of an extreme form of nativism, I argue that in Concepts Fodor modifies his account, abandoning his previous involvement with such a strong form of nativism. Instead he now argues for a kind of a more moderate and more plausible form of nativism. Secondly, I present what Fodor calls the “the standard argument” and also his strategy deployed in Concepts to block this argument. Finally, I criticize Fodor´s nativism as it is argued for in Concepts