The Transition From "Consciousness" to "Self-Consciousness" in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit"
Dissertation, University of California, San Diego (
1992)
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Abstract
This dissertation treats the disputed transition between the "Consciousness" and the "Self-Consciousness" chapters of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In the literature this transition has traditionally been a source of dispute since the issues that Hegel treats in these two chapters seem wholly disparate. The "Consciousness" chapter seems to be concerned with traditional epistemological problems, whereas the "Self-Consciousness" chapter seems to shift to social or ethical issues. This apparent break in the text runs counter to Hegel's systematic pretensions and threatens the alleged unity of the work. In this dissertation I argue that there is a hitherto unseen epistemological connecting link between the two chapters which, if understood correctly, helps to preserve the unity of the Phenomenology. Specifically, I claim that the epistemological categories of the "Consciousness" chapter become reinterpreted in the social sphere in the "Self-Consciousness" chapter, and thus although it appears that there is a shift in the text to social or political problems, nevertheless the epistemological issues continue in a novel way. ;In chapter one, I set up the problem of the dissertation and indicate why the standard Hegel literature has failed to solve it adequately. In chapter two, I interpret the "Introduction" to Hegel's Phenomenology in terms of the epistemological reading that I propose. In the third chapter, I analyze Hegel's manuscripts from 1804-5, which clearly state the epistemological agenda of the Phenomenology in a fashion that supplements the account in the "Introduction" of the Phenomenology itself. In chapters four, five and six, which represent the heart of my dissertation, I give a detailed analysis of the disputed sections, indicating the way in which the epistemological categories are interpreted at the social level. On the basis of this reading, I indicate briefly in chapters seven and eight how the rest of the Phenomenology fits into this interpretive scheme. Hence, this dissertation treats in great detail a relatively short section of text, but at the same time lays the groundwork for an interpretation of the Phenomenology and the Hegelian system as a whole