Revisiting the narrow latent scope bias in explanatory reasoning

Cognition 241 (C):105630 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105630

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,813

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The scope of rational requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
Violating requirements, exiting from requirements, and the scope of rationality.Errol Lord - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
State or process requirements?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):371-385.
On the completeness of orientation rules for causal discovery in the presence of latent confounders and selection bias.Jiji Zhang - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (16-17):1873-1896.
Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason.Matthias Michel & Megan A. K. Peters - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2757-2772.
Gain More Insight from Common Latent Factor in Structural Equation Modeling.Hussam Al Halbusi - 2021 - Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1793 (1):012030.
Unifying the requirements of rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
Extrapolation of Experimental Results through Analogical Reasoning from Latent Classes.Gerdien G. van Eersel, Julian Reiss & Gabriela V. Koppenol-Gonzalez - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):219-235.
Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.
White Individualism and the Problem of White Co-optation of the Term “Racism”.Albert G. Urquidez - 2022 - Radical Philosophy Review 25 (2):161-190.
How to derive a narrow-scope requirement from wide-scope requirements.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.
Negative polarity as scope marking.Chris Barker - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (5):483-510.
Better but still biased: Analytic cognitive style and belief bias.Dries Trippas, Gordon Pennycook, Michael F. Verde & Simon J. Handley - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (4):431-445.
Rethinking prestige bias.Azita Chellappoo - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8191-8212.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-07

Downloads
10 (#1,215,669)

6 months
7 (#484,016)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Confirmation, heuristics, and explanatory reasoning.Timothy McGrew - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):553-567.
The Instrumental Value of Explanations.Tania Lombrozo - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (8):539-551.

View all 13 references / Add more references