Abstract

Nietzsche’s metaethics is a topic which, especially in the last decade, has gained ever increasing attention among Anglo-American Nietzsche-scholars. Conversely, this topic has been almost ignored by continental philosophers. This paper aims to give a general overview of the ongoing discussion, focusing on several problems originating from the attempt to give a coherent and non-contradictory picture of both Nietzsche’s negative and positive metaethical position. Attention will be first directed to Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism (1) and then to his alleged proto-error theory (2). Subsequently, the focus will be on Nietzsche’s moral projectivism and the question of whether this position necessarily requires a non-cognitivist view of moral discourse (3). Finally, the last section will be devoted to a discussion of how to reconcile Nietzsche’s negative metaethics with his positive metaethics (4).