Abstract

In arguing for their position, one argument that is often used by the constructivist is that they are better able than the realist to avoid the threat of moral scepticism – where it is this claim that I want to consider further in this paper, particularly as it figures in the work of Christine Korsgaard. However, I want to consider this claim not in itself, but rather how it has fuelled a certain way of reading Kant, namely as a constructivist rather than a realist about the moral value of rational beings. For, it is held, we can see a constructivist and not a realist sensibility at work in the way in which Kant seeks to address sceptical concerns over such value claims, where this is said to be particularly evident in the Formula of Humanity argument in the Groundwork. I want to contend, by contrast, that when properly understood this text suggests the opposite: namely, that Kant’s attitude to scepticism here fits better with the one that Korsgaard attributes to the realist, and that the constructivist manoeuvres that she claims to identify are not to be found. Of course, this in itself does not show that Kant should be read as a realist, as there are other issues and other texts at stake in this controversy; nonetheless, I hope this discussion will at least neutralize one important part of the constructivist’s interpretative argument, while shedding light on the broader debate.