Abstract
I’m going to argue for something that some of you will find repugnant but which I can’t help thinking may be true—namely, that there are no determinate moral truths. As will become apparent, my interest in moral discourse as manifested in this paper derives more than a little from my interest in the theory of meaning. Moral discourse has always presented a puzzle for the theory of meaning and philosophical logic, and I take myself to be following the advice of Bertrand Russell when he recommended testing philosophical theories by their capacity to deal with puzzles, “since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science.” Section (1) offers an epistemological argument for the claim that there are no determinate moral truths. This argument raises further questions, which subsequent sections try to answer. In the course of answering those further questions, another, non-epistemological, argument is offered for the claim that there are no determinate moral truths. In the end, I hope we see not only that there are no determinately true moral propositions, but what it is about moral concepts which makes that so