Abstract

The central question which I address is whether appeal to a hypothetical contract between moral persons is acceptable as a method for justifying basic ethical principles. ;My first two substantive chapters concern general issues in metaethics, particularly the shortcomings of both standard naturalist and noncognitivist theories of evaluative language; some conditions of acceptability for methods of moral justification are proposed and supported as well. Firth's and Hare's methods fail to satisfy these criteria, while Brandt's present approach and Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium largely succeed. Rawls, quite correctly, intends his contract argument to apply only within the framework of this more basic method. ;Major aspects of Rawls' contract theory are examined at length in Chapter IV. My central concern is with the reasons Rawls gives for regarding his interpretation of the initial contract situation as the "rationally preferred" one. The concepts of impartiality, neutrality, and fairness are discussed at the outset. I then proceed to explain and criticize Rawls' reasons for imposing a "thick veil of ignorance" on the contractors. The argument that natural assets and social contingencies are "morally arbitrary" and hence should not influence the choice of principles of justice is found to be open to serious objection and to rest upon a specific type of egalitarian moral commitment. Rawls' "Kantian" argument is shown to lack sufficient support and to involve an unwarranted exclusion of certain deontological, perfectionist, and other teleological theories from serious consideration. ;Grice's contract theory, which omits the "veil," is examined in Chapter V, together with his account of prudential reasoning and his argument for a necessary connection between moral obligation and rationality. His type of contract approach is demonstrated to be unworkable due to vague description of the initial situation. Moreover, it has unacceptable implications and cannot serve as an appropriate basis for moral justification in any case. ;I conclude that the ideal contract method is at best a very conditional procedure of moral justification, far more suitable for some types of moral conceptions than for others. It seems unlikely, furthermore, that achievement of wide reflective equilibrium or "full rationality" in Brandt's sense would result in a consensus favoring any one description of the initial contract situation