Routes to relevance: Philosophies of relevant logics

Philosophy Compass 19 (2):e12965 (2024)
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Abstract

Relevant logics are a family of non-classical logics characterized by the behavior of their implication connectives. Unlike some other non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logic, there are multiple philosophical views motivating relevant logics. Further, different views seem to motivate different logics. In this article, we survey five major views motivating the adoption of relevant logics: Use Criterion, sufficiency, meaning containment, theory construction, and truthmaking. We highlight the philosophical differences as well as the different logics they support. We end with some questions for future research.

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Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University

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