What realism about agents requires

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e211 (2022)
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Abstract

Bruineberg et al. argue that the formal notion of a Markov blanket fails to provide a single principled boundary between an agent and its environment. I argue that one should not expect a general theory of agenthood to provide a single boundary; and the reliance on auxiliary assumptions is neither arbitrary nor reason to suspect instrumentalism.

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Mark Sprevak
University of Edinburgh

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Were You a Part of Your Mother?Elselijn Kingma - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):609-646.
Mechanisms and natural kinds.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):575-594.

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