Two Ways to Be Right about What One Is Thinking

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):33-44 (2011)
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Abstract

In this paper I describe two ways in which cogito-like judgments might be self-verifying. I then defend my claim that the only one of these is available to Burge as a coherent way for him to elaborate his claim that cogito-like judgments are both self-verifying and central to our rationality

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10.1163/221057011x554160

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References found in this work

Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
On Always being Right (about What One is Thinking).Finn Spicer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):137-160.

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