Abstract

In this text, I will address the question of whether human rights as moral rights exist objectively. This question is of great practical importance, because the granting of human rights should not depend on anything whims. Moral objectivity can be understood in various ways. The metaphysical realist considers moral objectivity in a strong sense. That is, it presupposes the existence of moral facts of a metaphysical nature. The expressionist prefers a weaker conception of moral objectivity. This can be explained by second-order moral attitudes, which are one of the defining features of the human rights language. The disadvantage of metaphysical realism is the epistemic uncertainty as to whether there is such a thing as metaphysical moral reality at all, or what its content is. This enduring uncertainty has the potential for moral skepticism. I will conclude that human rights are objective, at least in a weaker sense.The objectivity of human rights is an entirely human matter. It is not encoded in metaphysical reality, but in the way we think and talk about human rights. If we have doubts, then all we need is better self-understanding. This conclusion is optimistic because it means that human rights are objective regardless of whether there is a moral reality in a metaphysical sense. In addition, the metaphysical realist may accept an expressivist solution as a good choice in case he loses his faith.a metaphysical realist can accept an expressivist solution as a good choice in case he loses his faith.a metaphysical realist can accept an expressivist solution as a good choice in case he loses his faith.