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Why propositions can't be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 72-80 (2009)
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Citations of this work
Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.
Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances.Paul Elbourne - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):101-111.
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